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Abstract
This paper studies dynamic spectrum leasing in a cognitive radio network. There are two spectrum
sellers, who are two primary networks, each with an amount of licensed spectrum bandwidth. When
a seller has some unused spectrum, it would like to lease the unused spectrum to secondary users. A
coordinator helps to perform the spectrum leasing stage-by-stage. As the two sellers may have different
leasing period, there are three epochs, in which seller 1 has spectrum to lease in Epochs II and III, while
seller 2 has spectrum to lease in Epochs I and II. Each seller needs to decide how much spectrum it
should lease to secondary users in each stage of its leasing period, with a target at revenue maximization.
It is shown that, when the two sellers both have spectrum to lease (i.e., in Epoch II), the spectrum leasing
can be formulated as a non-cooperative game. Nash equilibria of the game are found in closed form.
Solutions of the two users in the three epochs are derived.
Index Terms
Cognitive radio, dynamic pricing, Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio has been considered as a promising solution to the spectrum shortage problem
in the near future. In cognitive radio, if a primary user (a licensed user with some licensed
spectrum bandwidth) has some unused spectrum for a certain amount of time, it may lease the
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2unused spectrum to secondary users. By this method, the spectrum opportunities are exploited,
and the primary user can earn extra payment from secondary users.
Spectrum leasing has been well investigated in the literature, in the modes of monopoly
spectrum leasing (in which there is one spectrum seller) and oligopoly spectrum leasing (in
which multiple spectrum sellers exist). In either mode, the research focus is on how to set the
spectrum price.
In monopoly spectrum leasing, the major target is to achieve the maximal revenue of the seller.
In the work of [1], there are a spectrum provider, a broker, and a number of secondary users. By
a Stackelberg game modeling, the broker optimally decides on the number of channels it should
purchase from the spectrum provider as well as the price it should use to sell the purchased
spectrum to secondary users. The work in [2] also considers a broker. It is assumed that for
a given spectrum price, the amount of spectrum demand from secondary users is random. The
work in [3] considers the impact of spectrum leasing on primary user performance (such as
possible extra interference to the primary system). An optimal solution is given for the primary
user, which strikes a balance between the earned revenue and the cost.
In oligopoly spectrum leasing, the major target is to achieve an equilibrium in the competition
among multiple spectrum sellers. Two brokers are assumed in [4]. Each broker decides on the
amount of spectrum that it should purchase from spectrum providers and on the spectrum price
that it should announce to secondary users, with a target at profit maximization. The work in
[5] also considers two brokers, by assuming that the leased spectrum may be shared by multiple
secondary users simultaneously. Therefore, interference among secondary users needs to be taken
into account. The works in [6], [7], [8] consider a duopoly market, in which the price competition
of two spectrum sellers is investigated by using game theoretical approaches. The work in [9]
discusses the case with multiple sellers. By using an evolutionary game model, a solution is
given for secondary users for their spectrum selection and for sellers for price setting. The work
in [10] considers multiple sellers as well as one broker, in which the impact of spectrum leasing
on sellers’ performance (i.e., service quality degradation) is taken into account. The work in
[11] considers heterogenous secondary users, i.e., different secondary users may have different
criteria on their spectrum leasing decisions.
In all above works, spectrum leasing is performed only once, and the price is fixed for the
whole spectrum leasing duration, referred to as static spectrum leasing. On the other hand,
dynamic spectrum leasing, in which the spectrum price may change over time, is more appropriate
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Fig. 1. Leasing periods of the two sellers.
for the cases that the secondary users may need spectrum at different time instants. In [12],
dynamic pricing in monopoly spectrum leasing is performed over infinite time horizon. The
spectrum price is set dynamically, with a target of long-term average revenue maximization. In
[13], dynamic pricing in monopoly spectrum leasing is performed over a finite duration. The
finite duration is divided into a number of stages, and the price in each stage is set up so as to
maximize the overall revenue. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research in the literature
on dynamic pricing with more than one spectrum seller.
To fill the research gap, in this paper, we study dynamic spectrum leasing problem in a duopoly
market with two sellers1. As the two sellers may have different leasing periods, the system has
three epochs, in which seller 1 has spectrum to lease in Epochs II and III, while seller 2 has
spectrum to lease in Epochs I and II. The main contributions in this paper are summarized as
follows. 1) We show that, the spectrum leasing problems of the sellers in Epoch I and Epoch
III are convex optimization problems. For Epoch II, we formulate spectrum leasing of the two
sellers as a non-cooperative game. We derive closed-form expressions for the Nash equilibria of
the non-cooperative game. 2) The amount of spectrum that seller 1 would like to lease in Epoch
III affects the non-cooperative game in Epoch II, and thus, affects the total revenues of the two
sellers. By analyzing properties of seller 1’s revenue in Epoch II and Epoch III, we propose a
method that finds the optimal amount of spectrum that seller 1 should lease to secondary users
1We consider two sellers (i.e., a duopoly spectrum market) for the following reasons. 1) A duopoly spectrum market is a
typical and popular scenario for cognitive radio, and has been adopted by many research efforts in the literature [4], [5], [6],
[7], [8]. 2) Sufficient insights can be provided by the duopoly scenario into the spectrum leasing, and our method in this paper
can be extended to the scenarios with more spectrum sellers, with increased complexity in analysis and presentation. For ease
of analysis and presentation, we consider a duopoly scenario.
4in Epoch III.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model is presented, and
the spectrum leasing problems for the two sellers are formulated. In Section III, Nash equilibria
of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II are derived. Section IV discusses how seller 1 should
distribute its spectrum to be leased in Epoch II and Epoch III. Numerical results are given in
Section V, and finally the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider two spectrum sellers (seller 1 and seller 2), one coordinator, and multiple secondary
users. The coordinator is to help the two sellers to lease spectrum to secondary users. The
two sellers are primary networks with a certain amount of licensed spectrum bandwidth. For
each seller, when the data traffic from its own users is light, the seller may partition its spectrum
bandwidth into two portions: primary portion and secondary portion. The primary portion will be
assigned to the seller’s own users, and the secondary portion can be leased to secondary users. In
specific, consider that seller 1 and seller 2 have bandwidth Q1 and Q2 in their secondary portion,
respectively. For each seller, the bandwidth in its secondary portion can be leased to secondary
users for a duration (called leasing period). Consider that the two sellers’ leasing periods are not
identical,2 and overlap with each other. Without loss of generality, we assume that the leasing
period of seller 2 starts earlier than the leasing period of seller 1. We also assume that the leasing
period of seller 2 ends earlier than that of seller 1.3 An illustration of the two leasing periods
is given in Fig. 1. Here the union of the two leasing periods contains N fixed-length stages.
For presentation simplicity, the last stage of seller 1’s leasing period is called stage 1, while the
first stage of seller 2’s leasing period is called stage N . Seller i (i = 1, 2) would distribute its
spectrum bandwidth Qi to be leased in the stages of its leasing period. In other words, it needs
to decide on the amount of spectrum bandwidth to be leased in each stage in its leasing period,
with a constraint that the total amount of leased spectrum bandwidth in the stages is bounded by
Qi. For seller i, denote the amount of spectrum bandwidth it would like to lease to secondary
users in stage n as dn,i. At the beginning of stage n, seller i should report to the coordinator
the information of dn,i.
2If the two leasing periods are identical, it is a special case of the problem considered in this paper.
3Note that the method in this paper can be straightforwardly extended to deal with the case when the leasing period of seller
2 ends later than that of seller 1.
5At the beginning of stage n, after the coordinator gets the information of dn,1 and dn,2, it would
set up a spectrum unit price (the price per unit bandwidth per stage) and lease the spectrum
bandwidth (dn,1 + dn,2) to secondary users. In other words, the coordinator should set up the
unit price to attract (dn,1 + dn,2) spectrum bandwidth demand from secondary users. Denote the
price p to attract d spectrum bandwidth demand as P (d), which is a function of d. Economics
analysis [14], [15] has shown that price and demand typically follow a linear model, and thus,
price p and spectrum bandwidth demand d satisfy the following feature:
p = P (d) = C0 − C1 · d (1)
in which C0 and C1 are coefficients. P (d) is a decreasing function of d. In addition, d · P (d)
should be an increasing function of d (as the total revenue for more leased spectrum bandwidth
should be higher), based on which we have
C0 > 2C1 (Q1 +Q2) . (2)
From Fig. 1, the union of the two sellers’ leasing periods can be divided into three epochs: In
Epoch I, only seller 2 has spectrum to lease; in Epoch II, both sellers have spectrum to lease;
and in Epoch III, only seller 1 has spectrum to lease. Denote the set of stages in Epoch I, II,
and III as NI, NII, and NIII, respectively. Denote the set of stages in the leasing period of seller
1 and seller 2 as N1 and N2, respectively. Thus, we have N1 = NII ∪NIII and N2 = NI ∪NII.
Seller i (i ∈ {1, 2}) aims at maximizing its total revenue over all the stages by deciding on
dn,i, n ∈ Ni. Next, the spectrum leasing problem in each epoch is discussed.
A. Spectrum Leasing Problem in Epoch I
In Epoch I, only seller 2 has spectrum to lease, and it does not know when seller 1 will
join the spectrum leasing market and how much spectrum bandwidth seller 1 will offer for
spectrum leasing. So seller 2 assumes a monopoly market. At a stage in Epoch I, once an
amount of spectrum is leased to secondary users, the spectrum can be used by secondary
users until the last stage of seller 2’s leasing period. Seller 2’s collected revenue at stage n is
(C0 − C1dn,2) dn,2 (n− |NIII|), in which | · | means cardinality of a set. To maximize its overall
revenue, primary use 2 should solve the following optimization problem4:
4In Epoch I, seller 2 does not know the value of |NIII|. However, it knows the value of (n− |NIII|) (the length from stage n
until the end of seller 2’s leasing period). Thus, in Problem 1, we use notation (n− |NIII|), for consistence of the formulated
spectrum leasing problems in the three epochs.
6Problem 1:
max
{dn,2|n∈N2}
∑
n∈N2
(C0 − C1dn,2) dn,2 (n− |NIII|)
s.t.
∑
n∈N2
dn,2 ≤ Q2
dn,2 ≥ 0,∀n ∈ N2.
(3)
Problem 1 is a convex optimization problem. Thus the global optimal solution of Problem 1 can
be achieved by existing numerical optimization methods.
B. Spectrum leasing Problem in Epoch II
At Epoch II’s first stage (denoted as stage l), seller 1 has available spectrum bandwidth Q1,
while we denote the remaining spectrum bandwidth of seller 2 as QII2 (in other words, spectrum
bandwidth with amount (Q2−QII2 ) has been leased out by seller 2 in Epoch I). At the beginning
of stage l, each seller does not know the presence of the other seller, and thus, assumes a
monopoly spectrum leasing. So each seller reports to the coordinator the amount of spectrum
bandwidth it would like to lease to secondary users in the stage. In specific, seller 1 first solves
the following convex optimization problem:
max
{dn,1|n∈N1}
∑
n∈N1
(C0 − C1dn,1) dn,1n
s.t.
∑
n∈N1
dn,1 ≤ Q1
dn,1 ≥ 0,∀n ∈ N1
(4)
and reports to the coordinator the values of dl,1 (dl,1 is from the optimal solution of the above
problem) and |N1| (the leasing duration for the dl,1 spectrum bandwidth). On the other hand,
seller 2 reports to the coordinator the values of dl,2 and (|N2| − |NI|) (which is the length of
seller 2’s remaining leasing period), in which dl,2 is from the optimal solution of the following
convex optimization problem:
max
{dn,2|n∈N2\NI}
∑
n∈N2\NI
(C0 − C1dn,2) dn,2 (n− |NIII|)
s.t.
∑
n∈N2\NI
dn,2 ≤ QII2
dn,2 ≥ 0,∀n ∈ N2\NI.
(5)
Then the coordinator feeds back to the two sellers by telling 1) that now two sellers have
spectrum to lease, 2) how much spectrum bandwidth each seller offers in this stage, and 3) how
long the leasing period is for each seller. From dl,1 and |N1| in the feedback information, seller 2
7can find out the available stock of seller 1, by searching the value of Q1 (using bisection search)
that makes dl,1 be in the optimal solution of the problem in (4). Similarly, seller 1 can also find
out the available stock of seller 2. Based on stock information of the other seller, each seller
adjusts the amount of offered spectrum bandwidth (dl,1 or dl,2) and resubmits to the coordinator,
and the coordinator decides on a unit price based on (1) with total spectrum demand (dl,1+dl,2).
In each subsequent stage (say stage n) in Epoch II, by knowing the existence of the other seller,
each seller reports to the coordinator the amount of offered spectrum bandwidth (dn,1 and dn,2),
and the coordinator decides on a unit price based on (1) with total spectrum demand (dn,1+dn,2).
In every stage in Epoch II, once an amount of spectrum bandwidth of a seller is leased
to secondary users, the spectrum can be used by secondary users until the last stage of the
corresponding seller’s leasing period.
A decision that seller 1 should make in Epoch II is the amount QIII1 of spectrum bandwidth it
reserves for Epoch III, where QIII1 ∈ [0, Q1]. In other words, seller 1 would like to lease spectrum
bandwidth (Q1 −QIII1 ) in Epoch II.
In Epoch II, the announced unit price at each stage (say stage n) depends on the sum of dn,1
and dn,2. Thus, there is a non-cooperative game between the two sellers. In this game, the two
players are seller 1 and seller 2, and the strategy of seller 1 and seller 2 are S1 , {dn,1|n ∈ NII}
and S2 , {dn,2|n ∈ NII}, respectively. The payoff function of seller 1 and seller 2 can be
expressed as
R1 (S1,S2) ,
∑
n∈NII
(C0 − C1 (dn,1 + dn,2)) dn,1n
and
R2 (S1,S2) ,
∑
n∈NII
(C0 − C1 (dn,1 + dn,2)) dn,2 (n− |NIII|),
respectively. Define the feasible region of seller 1’s strategy as
F1 (y) =
{
{dn,1|n ∈ NII}
∣∣∣ ∑
n∈NII
dn,1 ≤ y, dn,1 ≥ 0
}
when seller 1 would like to lease to secondary users spectrum bandwidth amount y in Epoch II,
and define the feasible region of seller 2’s strategy as
F2 (z) =
{
{dn,2|n ∈ NII}
∣∣∣ ∑
n∈NII
dn,2 ≤ z, dn,2 ≥ 0
}
when seller 2 would like to lease to secondary users spectrum bandwidth amount z in Epoch II.
The objective of seller 1 is to solve the following optimization problem
8Problem 2:
max
S1
R1 (S1,S2)
s.t. S1 ∈ F1
(
Q1 −QIII1
) (6)
and the objective of seller 2 is to solve the following optimization problem
Problem 3:
max
S2
R2 (S1,S2)
s.t. S2 ∈ F2
(
QII2
)
.
(7)
For the non-cooperative game of the two sellers, a Nash equilibrium defines a strategy pair
(S1,S2) that a seller cannot earn more revenue by deviating from its strategy while keeping the
other seller’s strategy unchanged. In other words, a Nash equilibrium should be a joint optimal
solution of Problem 2 and Problem 3.
Since the objective functions of Problem 2 and Problem 3 are continuous and concave, and
the feasible regions of the two sellers’ strategies are convex, closed, bounded, and uncoupled5,
there exists at least one Nash equilibrium [16].
C. Spectrum Leasing Problem in Epoch III
In Epoch III, only seller 1 is active in the spectrum market, and thus, monopoly spectrum
leasing is performed. Once an amount of spectrum bandwidth is leased to secondary users, the
spectrum can be used by secondary users until the end of Epoch III.
To maximize the revenue of seller 1 in Epoch III, the following optimization problem should
be solved.
Problem 4:
V
(
QIII1
)
, max
{dn,1|n∈NIII}
∑
n∈NIII
(C0 − C1dn,1) dn,1n
s.t.
∑
n∈NIII
dn,1 ≤ QIII1
dn,1 ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ NIII.
(8)
It can be seen that Problem 4 is a convex optimization problem, and thus, can be solved by
existing numerical optimization methods.
From the perspective of seller 1, it can adjust QIII1 . For a specific Q
III
1 , the two sellers need to
follow a Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative game in Epoch II. Thus, the strategy of seller
1 can be written as QIII1 and S1, while the strategy of seller 2 can be written as S2.
5When the two feasible regions are independent from each other, we say that the two feasible regions are uncoupled.
9When seller 1 reserves spectrum bandwidth QIII1 for Epoch III, it means that seller 1 would
like to lease spectrum bandwidth (Q1 − QIII1 ) in Epoch II. Accordingly, we denote the revenue
of seller 1 in Epoch II as U(Q1−QIII1 ), a function of (Q1−QIII1 ). Then for seller 1 to maximize
its overall revenue, the following optimization problem should be solved
Problem 5:
max
QIII1
U
(
Q1 −QIII1
)
+ V
(
QIII1
)
s.t. 0 ≤ QIII1 ≤ Q1.
(9)
In the following, in Section III we find out Nash equilibria in Epoch II for a specific QIII1 ,
and in Section IV we select the value of QIII1 for seller 1.
III. NASH EQUILIBRIA IN THE NON-COOPERATIVE GAME IN EPOCH II WITH GIVEN QIII1
A. Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in the Non-Cooperative Game in Epoch II when |NIII| ≤ 12
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: When |NIII| ≤ 12, there is only one Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative
game in Epoch II.
Proof:
Define the vectorized strategy of seller 1 and seller 2 in Epoch II as x1 = [d|NIII|+|NII|,1,
d|NIII|+(|NII|−1),1, ..., d|NIII|+1,1]
T and x2 =
[
d|NIII|+|NII|,2, d|NIII|+(|NII|−1),2, ..., d|NIII|+1,2
]T , respec-
tively, in which [·]T means transpose operation. The payoff function of seller 1 and seller 2 can
be rewritten as R1 (S1,S2) = R1 (x1,x2) and R2 (S1,S2) = R2 (x1,x2), respectively. Denote
x =
(
xT1 ,x
T
2
)T and define
σ(x) = R1 (x1,x2) +R2 (x1,x2) . (10)
Then the pseudo-gradient of σ(x) can be given as
k (x) =
 ∇1R1 (x1,x2)
∇2R2 (x1,x2)
 (11)
where |NII| × 1 matrix ∇1R1 (x1,x2) is the gradient of R1 (x1,x2) with respect to vector x1,
and |NII| × 1 matrix ∇2R2 (x1,x2) is the gradient of R2 (x1,x2) with respect to vector x2.
According to Theorem 2 and Theorem 6 of [16], the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative
game in Epoch II is unique if the 2|NII|×2|NII| symmetric matrix L(x) = −
[
K(x) +KT (x)
]
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is positive definite, where K(x) is the Jacobian of k(x) with respect to x. After some math
manipulation, the matrix L(x) can be written as the following form
L(x) =
 L11(x)
L21(x)
L12(x)
L22(x)
 (12)
where L11(x) = Diag
(
4C1(|NIII|+ |NII|), 4C1(|NIII|+ |NII| − 1), ..., 4C1(|NIII|+ 1)
)
, L12(x) =
L21(x) = Diag
(
C1(|NIII| + 2|NII|), C1(|NIII| + 2|NII| − 2), ..., C1(|NIII| + 2)
)
, and L22(x) =
Diag
(
4C1|NII|, 4C1(|NII|−1), ..., 4C1
)
. Here Diag(···) means a diagonal matrix with all diagonal
elements listed in (· · ·). The matrix L(x) can be guaranteed to be positive definite, if the leading
principal minors are all positive [17], i.e., the determinant of m × m upper-left submatrix of
L(x) is larger than 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., 2|NII|. Since there is
Det
 A
C
B
D
 = Det (A)Det (D −CA−1B)
when matrix A is invertible [18], the determinant of m × m upper-left submatrix of L(x) is
larger than 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., 2|NII| when the following inequalities hold
12 (|NII| − k)2 + 12|NIII| (|NII| − k)− |NIII|2 > 0, ∀k = 0, 1, ..., (|NII| − 1) , (13)
i.e., when
(|NII| − k)
|NIII| >
(
−1
2
+
1√
3
)
,∀k ∈ 0, 1, ..., (|NII| − 1) . (14)
The inequalities in (14) hold if
|NIII| < 1−1
2
+ 1√
3
= 12.9282. (15)
This completes the proof.
As the number of stages in Epoch III is normally limited, it is very likely that the value of
|NIII| is bounded by 12, and thus, Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II
is unique. Nevertheless, in next subsection, we show how to find Nash equilibria in the non-
cooperative game in Epoch II without constraint |NIII| ≤ 12 (i.e., Nash equilibrium may or may
not be unique).
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B. Finding Nash Equilibria in the Non-Cooperative Game in Epoch II
As aforementioned, a Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II is a joint
optimal solution of Problem 2 and Problem 3. As both Problem 2 and Problem 3 are convex
problems and satisfy the Slater’s condition, KKT condition is a sufficient and necessary condition
for optimal solution for each problem [19], [20], [21].
For the ease of presentation, we denote QIIc1 = Q1 −QIII1 as the spectrum bandwidth amount
that seller 1 would like to lease to secondary users in Epoch II. For Problem 2, the KKT condition
is
2C1ndn,1−(C0−C1dn,2)n+ λ− µn = 0, ∀n ∈ NII (16a)
λ
(∑
n∈NII
dn,1 −QIIc1
)
= 0 (16b)
µndn,1 = 0, ∀n ∈ NII (16c)∑
n∈NII
dn,1 ≤ QIIc1 (16d)
dn,1 ≥ 0,∀n ∈ NII (16e)
λ ≥ 0;µn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ NII (16f)
where λ and µn are Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints
∑
n∈NII
dn,1 ≤ QIIc1 and
dn,1 ≥ 0, respectively.
For Problem 3, the KKT condition is
2C1 (n− |NIII|) dn,2 − (C0 − C1dn,1) (n− |NIII|)
+ζ − νn = 0, ∀n ∈ NII (17a)
ζ
(∑
n∈NII
dn,2 −QII2
)
= 0 (17b)
νndn,2 = 0, ∀n ∈ NII (17c)∑
n∈NII
dn,2 ≤ QII2 (17d)
dn,2 ≥ 0,∀n ∈ NII (17e)
ζ ≥ 0; νn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ NII (17f)
where ζ and νn are Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints
∑
n∈NII
dn,2 ≤ QII2 and
dn,2 ≥ 0, respectively.
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To get Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II, the equations (16) and (17)
should be solved jointly.
We have two properties for the joint optimal solution:
• Property 1: Equality should hold in (16d) and (17d) (in other words, we have
∑
n∈NII
dn,1 =
QIIc1 and
∑
n∈NII
dn,2 = Q
II
2 ).
• Property 2: If dn,1 > 0 (n ∈ NII), then we have µn = 0; if dn,2 > 0, then we have νn = 0.
Property 1 is due to the facts that the objective function of Problem 2 is a monotonically increas-
ing function of dn,1 (n ∈ NII) and that the objective function of Problem 3 is a monotonically
increasing function of dn,2 (n ∈ NII). Property 2 can be obtained directly from the equalities
(16c) and (17c).
Next, we try to find the expressions of dn,1 and dn,2 by solving (16) and (17).
From the equalities (16a) and (17a), dn,1 and dn,2 for n ∈ NII can be expressed as
dn,1 =
(C0 − C1dn,2)n− λ+ µn
2C1n
, (18)
dn,2 =
(C0 − C1dn,1) (n− |NIII|)− ζ + νn
2C1 (n− |NIII|) , (19)
from which we have
dn,1 =
2 (C0n− λ+ µn)
3C1n
− C0 (n− |NIII|)− ζ + νn
3C1 (n− |NIII|) , (20)
dn,2 = −C0n− λ+ µn
3C1n
+
2 (C0 (n− |NIII|)− ζ + νn)
3C1 (n− |NIII|) . (21)
Define Z1 = {n|dn,1 > 0, dn,2 > 0, n ∈ NII}, Z2 = {n|dn,1 > 0, dn,2 = 0, n ∈ NII},
Z3 = {n|dn,1 = 0, dn,2 > 0, n ∈ NII} and Z4 = {n|dn,1 = 0, dn,2 = 0, n ∈ NII}. Then {Z1, Z2,
Z3, Z4} constitutes a decomposition of the set NII, which means that Z1
⋃Z2⋃Z3⋃Z4 = NII
and Zi
⋂Zj = ∅ for i 6= j and i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Totally there are 22|NII| decompositions.
Next we find out the expressions of dn,1 and dn,2 for a specific decomposition {Z1, Z2, Z3,
Z4}.
From Property 1, we have ∑
n∈Z1
dn,1 +
∑
n∈Z2
dn,1 = Q
IIc
1 ,
∑
n∈Z1
dn,2 +
∑
n∈Z3
dn,2 = Q
II
2 .
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In the two equations, substituting the expressions of dn,1 and dn,2 in (20) and (21) for n ∈ Z1,
substituting the expressions of dn,1 and dn,2 in (18) and (19) for n ∈ Z2 and n ∈ Z3, and using
Property 2, we have the following equations:
−A11λ+ A12ζ = QIIc1 −
∑
n∈Z1
C0
3C1
− ∑
n∈Z2
C0
2C1
A21λ− A22ζ = QII2 −
∑
n∈Z1
C0
3C1
− ∑
n∈Z3
C0
2C1
(22)
where
A11 =
∑
n∈Z1
2
3C1n
+
∑
n∈Z2
1
2C1n
, (23)
A12 =
∑
n∈Z1
1
3C1 (n− |NIII|) , (24)
A21 =
∑
n∈Z1
1
3C1n
, (25)
A22 =
∑
n∈Z1
2
3C1 (n− |NIII|) +
∑
n∈Z3
1
2C1 (n− |NIII|) . (26)
Note that A11, A12, A21 and A22 are all larger than zero. According to the equations in (22), the
Lagrange multipliers λ and ζ can be expressed as
λ = − A22
A11A22−A21A12
(
QIIc1 −
∑
n∈Z1
C0
3C1
− ∑
n∈Z2
C0
2C1
)
− A12
A11A22−A21A12
(
QII2 −
∑
n∈Z1
C0
3C1
− ∑
n∈Z3
C0
2C1
)
,
(27)
ζ = − A21
A11A22−A21A12
(
QIIc1 −
∑
n∈Z1
C0
3C1
− ∑
n∈Z2
C0
2C1
)
− A11
A11A22−A21A12
(
QII2 −
∑
n∈Z1
C0
3C1
− ∑
n∈Z3
C0
2C1
)
.
(28)
With the aid of Property 2 and using equations (18), (19), (20), and (21), the closed-form
expressions of dn,1 and dn,2 for n ∈ NII are given as follows:
dn,1 =

2(C0n−λ)
3C1n
− C0(n−|NIII|)−ζ
3C1(n−|NIII|) if n ∈ Z1
C0n−λ
2C1n
if n ∈ Z2
0 if n ∈ Z3
⋃Z4
(29)
dn,2 =

−C0n−λ
3C1n
+ 2(C0(n−|NIII|)−ζ)
3C1(n−|NIII|) if n ∈ Z1
C0(n−|NIII|)−ζ
2C1(n−|NIII|) if n ∈ Z3
0 if n ∈ Z2
⋃Z4
(30)
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where λ and ζ are given in (27) and (28), respectively.
By now, given the decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4}, expressions of dn,1 and dn,2 for n ∈ NII are
derived. To guarantee that every equality or inequality in (16) and (17) is satisfied, a feasibility
check is further required, which is given as follows:
1) λ and ζ , which can be calculated from (27) and (28), are non-negative.
2) dn,1 and dn,2, which are calculated from (29) and (30), are non-negative for n ∈ NII.
3) µn and νn, which can be calculated from (18) and (19) given the obtained dn,1, dn,2, λ
and ζ , are non-negative for n ∈ NII.
If the above feasibility check passes, the decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4} is said to be feasible,
and the derived dn,1 and dn,2 expressions in (29) and (30) for n ∈ NII given the decomposition
{Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4} is a Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II.
For the set NII, there are 22|NII| possible decompositions. To find all Nash equilibria of the
game in Epoch II, an exhaustive search of all 22|NII| decompositions is required. As the number
of stages in Epoch II is normally very limited, and the calculations in checking feasibility of
each decomposition are simple, an exhaustive search of all 22|NII| decompositions is considered
to be acceptable. In addition, the following theorem is helpful in reducing the complexity in the
exhaustive search.
Theorem 2: For a feasible decomposition, if there exists a stage (say stage n) in Z4 (i.e.,
dn,1 = dn,2 = 0), then all stages with a lower index in Epoch II should belong to Z4.
Proof: We use the proof by contradiction. In the Nash equilibrium of the decomposition,
suppose there is n† satisfying n† < n, n† ∈ NII\Z4. We first assume that n† ∈ Z2, which
indicates that dn†,1 > 0, dn†,2 = 0. Then the total revenue collected over stage n and stage n†
by seller 1 is (C0 − C1dn†,1) dn†,1n†. By interchanging seller 1’s offered spectrum bandwidth
amounts in stage n and stage n†, the total revenue that seller 1 collects in stages n and n†
becomes (C0 − C1dn†,1) dn†,1n, which is larger than (C0 − C1dn†,1) dn†,1n† since n† < n. This
contradicts the definition of Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, n† ∈ Z1 or n† ∈ Z3 also leads to a contradiction.
This completes the proof.
Remark: Theorem 2 shows that in a feasible decomposition, if Z4 is not empty, then it contains
consecutive stages until the end of Epoch II. Therefore, in the exhaustive search of all possible
decompositions, we can skip those decompositions in which Z4 contains non-consecutive stages
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or does not last until the end of Epoch II. Thus, the number of decompositions that we should
check reduces from 2|2NII| to
∑|NII|
i=0 3
i.
So far all Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative game in Epoch II have been found. If there
exists only one unique Nash equilibrium (e.g., when |NIII| ≤ 12), then both sellers follow the
unique Nash equilibrium. If there are two or more Nash equilibria, the two sellers need to select
one Nash equilibrium to follow. Here it is assumed that the two sellers agree to follow the Nash
equilibrium that maximizes the minimum unit-bandwidth revenue of the two sellers. Here for
seller 1, its unit-bandwidth revenue is the ratio of its total revenue in Epoch II to QIIc1 ; for seller
2, its unit-bandwidth revenue is the ratio of its total revenue in Epoch II to QII2 .
IV. TOTAL REVENUE MAXIMIZATION FOR SELLER 1
In the previous section, we have found the strategies of the two sellers in Epoch II with a
specific QIII1 (the bandwidth that seller 1 reserves for Epoch III). Now, we try to solve Problem 5,
i.e., find out the optimal value of QIII1 that maximizes seller 1’s total revenue. A method could be:
1) for each possible value of QIII1 , search all possible Nash equilibria, find the Nash equilibrium
that maximizes the minimum unit-bandwidth revenue of the two sellers, and calculate the revenue
that seller 1 can earn during its leasing period; 2) compare the revenue values that seller 1 can
earn during its leasing period with different QIII1 , and select the optimal Q
III
1 that makes seller
1 earn the most revenue. However, the complexity of the method is huge, due to the infinite
number of values of QIII1 ∈ [0, Q1]. Thus, we target at an approximation method to select QIII1 .
When QIII1 = x, U(Q1 − x) and V (x) given in (8) are the revenue of seller 1 in Epoch II and
Epoch III, respectively. To select x (i.e., QIII1 ), we need to evaluate how V (x) and U (Q1 − x)
change when x varies.
Lemma 1: The function V (x) is an increasing and concave function with x.
Proof: The proof follows a similar procedure to the proof of Lemma 6 of [22].
Now we evaluate function U(Q1 − x) when x varies. To evaluate U(Q1 − x) for a specific
decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4}, we need to know dn,1 and dn,2 (n ∈ NII) in the Nash equilibrium
corresponding to the decomposition. Therefore, next we show how dn,1 and dn,2 change when
x varies.
Consider a decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4}. Consider two QIIc1 values (recalling that QIIc1 =
Q1 − QIII1 ): Q† and Q‡, with Q† ≤ Q‡. Assume the decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4} is feasible
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for both QIIc1 values. For the decomposition, denote the corresponding Nash equilibrium when
QIIc1 = Q
† as (
S†1,S†2
)
,
({
d†n,1|n ∈ NII
}
,
{
d†n,2|n ∈ NII
})
,
and the corresponding Nash equilibrium when QIIc1 = Q
‡ as(
S‡1,S‡2
)
,
({
d‡n,1|n ∈ NII
}
,
{
d‡n,2|n ∈ NII
})
.
Then the following lemmas can be expected.
Lemma 2: For seller 1, d†n,1 ≤ d‡n,1 for n ∈ Z2, and d†n,1 = d‡n,1 = 0 for n ∈ Z3
⋃Z4.
Proof: By the definitions of set Z3 and Z4, seller 1 does not offer spectrum bandwidth to
be leased in stages in Z3 and Z4, and thus, d†n,1 = d‡n,1 = 0 for n ∈ Z3
⋃Z4.
For n ∈ Z2, with the aid of (29) and (27), we have
d†n,1 − d‡n,1 = C0A222C1n(A11A22−A21A12)
(
Q† −Q‡)
≤ 0
(31)
in which the inequality comes from A22 ≥ 0, Q† ≤ Q‡, and (A11A22 − A21A12) > 0 according
to (23), (24), (25), and (26).
This completes the proof.
Lemma 3: For seller 2, d†n,2 ≤ d‡n,2 for n ∈ Z3, and d†n,2 = d‡n,2 = 0 for n ∈ Z2
⋃Z4.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof for Lemma 2, and thus, is omitted here.
Theorem 3: If a decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4} is feasible when QIII1 = x ∈ I where I ⊆
[0, Q1] is an interval, then when the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the decomposition is
followed by the two sellers in Epoch II, seller 1’s revenue U(Q1−x) in Epoch II can be written
as U(Q1 − x) = G(x) − H(x) where G(x) and H(x) are monotonically increasing functions
with respect to x ∈ I.
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Proof: Suppose the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4}
is ({dn,1|n ∈ NII}, {dn,2|n ∈ NII}). Then U(Q1 − x) can be written as
U(Q1 − x)
=
∑
n∈NII
(C0 − C1 (dn,1 + dn,2)) dn,1n
(a)
=
∑
n∈Z1
(C0 − C1 (dn,1 + dn,2)) dn,1n
+
∑
n∈Z2
(C0 − C1dn,1) dn,1n
(b)
=
∑
n∈Z1
(
C0
3
+ ζ
3(n−|NIII|) +
λ
3n
)(
ζ
3C1(n−|NIII|) − 2λ3C1n
+ C0
3C1
)
n+
∑
n∈Z2
(C0 − C1dn,1) dn,1n
=
∑
n∈Z1
(
ζ2
9C1(n−|NIII|)2 +
2C0ζ
9C1(n−|NIII|) +
C20
9C1
)
n
− ∑
n∈Z1
(
ζλ
9C1n(n−|NIII|) +
2λ2
9C1n2
+ C0λ
9C1n
)
n
+
∑
n∈Z2
(C0 − C1dn,1) dn,1n
(32)
where (a) holds since dn,1 = 0 for n ∈ Z3
⋃Z4 and dn,2 = 0 for n ∈ Z2, and (b) can be
obtained by substituting dn,1 and dn,2 according to (29) and (30).
As the decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4} is feasible, λ and ζ are non-negative. Additionally,
from (27) and (28), it can be seen that λ and ζ are monotonically decreasing with QIIc1 , i.e.,
(Q1 − x). So in the expression (32), both the term
∑
n∈Z1
(
ζ2
9C1(n−|NIII|)2 +
2C0ζ
9C1(n−|NIII|) +
C20
9C1
)
n
and the term
∑
n∈Z1
(
ζλ
9C1n(n−|NIII|) +
2λ2
9C1n2
+ C0λ
9C1n
)
n are monotonically decreasing with QIIc1 , and
thus, are monotonically increasing with x (as QIIc1 = Q1 − x). It can be also checked that the
term
∑
n∈Z2
(C0 − C1dn,1) dn,1n in (32) is a monotonically increasing function with respect to QIIc1
(since the function (C0 − C1y) y is monotonically increasing with y and dn,1 grows with QIIc1
[from Lemma 2]), and thus, is a monotonically decreasing function with respect to x.
Define
G(x) =
∑
n∈Z1
(
ζ2
9C1 (n−|NIII|) 2+
2C0ζ
9C1 (n−|NIII|) +
C20
9C1
)
n (33)
and
H(x) =
∑
n∈Z1
(
ζλ
9C1n (n− |NIII|) +
2λ2
9C1n2
+
C0λ
9C1n
)
n−
∑
n∈Z2
(C0 − C1dn,1) dn,1n. (34)
It can be seen that U(Q1−x) = G(x)−H(x), and both G(x) and H(x) monotonically increase
with x.
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This completes the proof.
In Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorem 3, it is assumed that the decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4}
is feasible for x = Q1−Q†, x = Q1−Q‡ or x ∈ I. The next theorem will answer the following
question: If a decomposition is feasible for a specific value of x, will it continue to be feasible
if x increases or decreases?
Theorem 4: Assume a decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4} is feasible for x = x0 ∈ [0, Q1]. If x
increases from x0, then there exists a point denoted x1 ∈ [x0, Q1] such that the decomposition is
always feasible in interval [x0, x1], and is always infeasible in interval (x1, Q1]. If x decreases
from x0, then there exists a point denoted x2 ∈ [0, x0] such that the decomposition is always
feasible in interval [x2, x0], and is always infeasible in interval [0, x2).
Proof: Here we only prove the case when x increases, as the case when x decreases can
be proved similarly.
For an x (i.e., QIII1 ) value, the feasibility of decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4} is checked as
follows: calculate λ and ζ based on (27) and (28), calculate dn,1 and dn,2 based on (29), (30),
and the calculated λ and ζ values, and calculate µn and νn based on (18), (19), and the calculated
dn,1, dn,2, λ and ζ values. If all the values of λ, ζ , dn,1, dn,2, µn, and νn (n ∈ NII) are non-
negative, then the decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4} is feasible; otherwise, it is infeasible.
Expressions (27) and (28) show that λ and ζ are linear functions of x (i.e., QIII1 ).
Expressions (29) and (30) show that dn,1 and dn,2 are linear functions of λ and ζ , and thus,
are linear functions of x.
Expressions (18) and (19) show that µn and νn are linear functions of λ, ζ , dn,1, and dn,2,
and thus, are linear functions of x.
Overall, λ, ζ , dn,1, dn,2, µn, and νn (n ∈ NII) are all linear functions of x (i.e., QIII1 ).
When x = x0, as the decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4} is feasible, all the λ, ζ , dn,1, dn,2, µn,
and νn (n ∈ NII) are non-negative. When x increases from x, values of λ, ζ , dn,1, dn,2, µn, and
νn linearly change accordingly. If at one point, say x = x1, one of λ, ζ , dn,1, dn,2, µn, and νn
decreases to value 0, then we can see that for x ∈ [x0, x1], the decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4}
is always feasible, and for x ∈ (x1, Q1], the decomposition is always infeasible.6
This completes the proof.
6As an extreme case, if λ, ζ, dn,1, dn,2, µn, and νn all keep non-negative when x increases from x0 to Q1, then we have
x1 = Q1.
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Remark: Theorem 4 shows that if a decomposition {Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4} is feasible for x = x0, then
there exists an interval of x containing x0 such that the decomposition is feasible inside the
interval, and infeasible outside the interval.
Based on Lemma 1, Theorem 3, and Theorem 4, we propose that seller 1 uses the following
Algorithm 1 to select x (i.e., QIII1 ).
Algorithm 1 Searching procedure for x (i.e., QIII1 ).
1: Set x∗ = 0, and R∗ = 0.
2: Set x† = 0
3: For x = x†, find out all feasible Nash equilibria, and pick up the Nash equilibrium that
maximizes the minimal unit-bandwidth revenue of the two sellers.
4: Find (using bisection search) a point denoted x1 such that the Nash equilibrium picked in
Step 3 is feasible for x ∈ [x†, x1], and infeasible for x ∈ (x1, Q1].
5: Set x‡ = x1.
6: The Nash equilibrium picked in Step 3 is feasible for x ∈ [x†, x‡]. For complexity reduction,
approximately seller 1 considers that the Nash equilibrium picked in Step 3 is followed by
both sellers when x ∈ [x†, x‡]. The revenue of seller 1 is U(Q1−x)+V (x). Here U(Q1−x)
is the difference of two monotonically increasing functions of x (from Theorem 3), while
V (x) is an increasing function of x (from Lemma 1). Thus, U(Q1−x)+V (x) can be viewed
as the difference of two monotonically increasing functions of x ∈ [x†, x‡]. To maximize
the difference of two monotonically increasing functions, a polyblock method can be used
(please refer to [23], [24] for details). Denote the optimal point as xˆ and the corresponding
revenue U(Q1 − xˆ) + V (xˆ) of seller 1 as Rˆ.
7: If Rˆ > R∗, then set x∗ = xˆ and R∗ = Rˆ.
8: If x‡ = Q1, then terminate the algorithm, and output x∗.
9: Set x† = x‡, and proceed to Step 3.
In the algorithm, x∗ denotes the selection of seller 1 for x, and R∗ denotes the corresponding
overall revenue of seller 1. For x = x† = 0, in Step 3 we first select the Nash equilibrium that
maximizes the minimal unit-bandwidth revenue of the two sellers. In Steps 4 and 5, we find
the interval of x, denoted [x†, x‡], such that the selected Nash equilibrium is feasible inside the
interval and infeasible when x > x‡. We approximately consider that the Nash equilibrium is
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TABLE I
THE NUMBER OF DECOMPOSITIONS WITHOUT AND WITH THE AID OF THEOREM 2.
|NII| 2 4 6 8 10 15 20
Total number of decompositions 16 256 4096 6.6× 105 1.0× 106 1.1× 109 1.1× 1012
Checked decompositions (with Theorem 2) 13 121 1093 9841 8.9× 105 2.2× 107 5.2× 109
followed by both sellers for the interval x ∈ [x†, x‡].7 Then for x ∈ [x†, x‡], seller 1’s revenue
U(Q1 − x) + V (x) can be shown as the difference of two monotonically increasing functions
of x. Existing methods in the literature (such as a polyblock algorithm) can be used to find the
optimal value of x ∈ [x†, x‡], denoted xˆ, such that the overall revenue of seller 1 is maximized.
Then the xˆ is a candidate for seller 1’s selection of x. Then we set x† = x‡ in Step 9 and
repeat the above procedure, and find other candidates for seller 1’s selection of x. Among all
the candidates, the one that has the maximal overall revenue of seller 1 is eventually selected
by seller 1.
Overall, the strategies of the two sellers are as follows. In Epoch I, seller 2 derives its optimal
strategy by solving Problem 1. At the beginning of Epoch II, seller 1 uses Algorithm 1 to find
the value of x, denoted x∗, Then in the non-cooperative game in Epoch II with QIII1 = x
∗, both
sellers follow the Nash equilibrium that maximizes the minimal unit-bandwidth revenue of the
two sellers. In Epoch III, seller 1 can derive its optimal strategy by solving Problem 4 with
QIII1 = x
∗.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Verification of the Analysis
We use numerical results by Matlab to verify the theoretical analysis in this paper. Since the
spectrum leasing problem in Epoch I and Epoch III are both convex optimization problems,
here we focus on Epoch II. At the beginning of Epoch II, seller 1 has spectrum bandwidth with
amount Q1 = 100, while seller 2 has available spectrum bandwidth with amount QII2 = 60. We
take C0 = 480 and C1 = 1. The number of stages in Epoch III is |NIII| = 3.
7If |NIII| ≤ 12, then according to Theorem 1, the Nash equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium for x ∈ [x†, x‡], and thus,
is always followed by both sellers when x ∈ [x†, x‡].
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Fig. 2. V (x) versus x (i.e., QIII1 ).
1) Effectiveness of Theorem 2: In this subsection, the effectiveness of Theorem 2 in com-
plexity reduction is verified. Table I lists the number of all possible decompositions and the
number of decompositions that should be checked for feasibility with the aid of Theorem 2. It
is clear that using Theorem 2 can significantly reduce the number of decompositions that should
be checked.
2) Verification of Lemma 1: In this subsection, Lemma 1 is verified. Fig. 2 plots the function
V (x) (the revenue of seller 1 in Epoch III) as x (i.e., QIII1 ) grows from 0 to 100. From Fig. 2,
it can be seen that the function V (x) is an increasing and concave function with respect to
x, which is consistent with Lemma 1. Note that the reference line in Fig. 2 is a straight line
connecting points (0, V (0)) and (100, V (100)), which helps to observe the concavity of function
V (x).
3) Verification of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3: In this subsection, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 are
verified. Consider NII = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Fig. 3 plots dn,1 and dn,2 versus the stage index n for
a feasible decomposition in which Z1 = {7, 8}, Z2 = {6}, Z3 = ∅, and Z4 = {4, 5} when
QIIc1 is set to be 70, 80, and 90. Fig. 4 plots dn,1 and dn,2 versus the stage index for a feasible
decomposition in which Z1 = {8}, Z2 = ∅, Z3 = {7}, and Z4 = {4, 5, 6} when QIIc1 is set to
be 2, 5, and 8. From Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, it can be seen that, when QIIc1 changes, dn,1 and dn,2
vary in the same way as Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 describe.
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4) Verification of Theorem 3: In this subsection, the characteristic of U(Q1−x) described in
Theorem 3 is verified. Still consider NII = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Two decompositions are investigated,
which are listed in Table II. Consider two intervals of x: [0, 30] and [40, 70], in which the two
decompositions are feasible, respectively. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 plot the function U(Q1− x) as well
as G(x) and H(x) (from Theorem 3) for the two decompositions over the two corresponding
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TABLE II
THE DECOMPOSITIONS USED WHEN VERIFYING THEOREM 3
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4
1st decomposition {7, 8} {6} ∅ {4, 5}
2nd decomposition {7, 8} ∅ ∅ {4, 5, 6}
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Fig. 5. Functions U(Q1 − x), G(x) and H(x) (x ∈ [0, 30]) for the first decomposition in Table II.
intervals, respectively. It can be seen that both the functions G(x) and H(x) are monotonically
increasing for each decomposition in the corresponding interval of x, which is consistent with
Theorem 3.
B. Comparison with a cooperative scheme
Now we compare with other schemes. As there is no research in the literature on dynamic
pricing for more than one seller, we compare with a cooperative scheme. The difference of the
cooperative scheme from our proposed scheme is as follows. When the two sellers know the
existence of each other (i.e., at the beginning of Epoch II), the two sellers cooperate to jointly
maximize the total revenue of them over Epoch II and III, by solving the optimization problem
shown in (35).
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Fig. 7. The revenue of the two sellers in our proposed scheme and the cooperative scheme.
max
{dn,1|n∈NII∪NIII},{dn,2|n∈NII}
∑
n∈NII
(C0 − C1(dn,1 + dn,2)) dn,1n+
∑
n∈NIII
(C0 − C1dn,1) dn,1n
+
∑
n∈NII
(C0 − C1(dn,1 + dn,2)) dn,2(n− |NIII|)
s.t.
∑
n∈NII∪NIII
dn,1 ≤ Q1∑
n∈NII
dn,2 ≤ QII2
dn,1 ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ NII ∪NIII
dn,2 ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ NII.
(35)
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For performance comparison, the simulation is set up as follows. Since the cooperative scheme
and our proposed scheme perform the same in Epoch I, we set NI = ∅. And NII = {6, 5, 4, 3},
NIII = {2, 1}. We fix the sum of Q1 and Q2 to be 200, and consider three configurations of
(Q1, Q2): (50, 150), (100, 100), and (150, 50). Fig. 7 shows the achieved revenue of the two
sellers in our proposed scheme and the cooperative scheme. It can be seen that each seller’s
revenue in our proposed non-cooperative scheme is very close to that in the cooperative scheme,
thus verifying the efficiency of our proposed scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate spectrum leasing with two sellers. In Epoch II, the two sellers
both have spectrum to lease, and competition between the two sellers exists. Thus, the spectrum
leasing in Epoch II is formulated as a non-cooperative game. Nash equilibria of the game are
derived in closed form by jointly solving two optimization problems. By analyzing the choices
of seller 1, solutions of the two sellers in the spectrum leasing are developed. The analysis
and solutions in this work should help design oligopoly spectrum leasing strategies in future
cognitive radio networks.
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